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12/7 AND 9/11: WAR, LIBERTIES, AND THE LESSONS
OF HISTORY
Eric L. Muller*
Since September 11, we have been living in the darkness of two histori-
cal shadows. Both are shadows of civil liberties disasters-moments in our na-
tion's history when the balance between domestic freedom and domestic secu-
rity tipped dangerously away from freedom.
One of them, the more obvious of the two, is a shadow cast by World
War II. The images of airplanes crashing into buildings and the pandemonium
on the streets of New York took all of us-even those of us who were not alive
on December 7, 1941-back to the panic of that earlier assault on American
soil. And as it became clear to us that the terrorists were Arabs, and reports of
vigilante violence against people thought to be Arab or Muslim appeared in the
news, the shadow of Pearl Harbor's domestic aftermath moved even more fully
across the national consciousness. Were we headed for a reenactment of the
horrors unleashed on Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ances-
try in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack? For many people, each of the Bush
Administration's recent assertions of power-the power to detain or interrogate
certain aliens, to monitor certain attorney-client conversations, to run military
tribunals, and others-has seemed an ominous lurch into the shadow of the Sec-
ond World War's excesses.
The other shadow is a bit harder to see. It too is a war-cast shadow, but
the war was a cold one. It is what we now call McCarthyism, and its first creep-
ing darkness appeared here in West Virginia, almost exactly fifty-one years ago,
Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. I presented this article as the
Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture at the University of West Virginia College of Law on
February 18, 2002, an opportunity for which I thank the faculty of the College of Law, the
College's dean, John W. Fisher II, and my friend and colleague Marion Crain. I thank Jocelyn
Ferguson for her research assistance.
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when Joe McCarthy stood before the Ohio County Republican Women's Club
in Wheeling and waved in the air a list of fifty-seven alleged Communists in the
U.S. State Department. "The reason why we find ourselves in a position of im-
potency," the junior senator from Wisconsin said that day, "is not because our
... enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous
actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation."'
In early December, our Attorney General lashed out at those who have
criticized his post-September-i l investigation and enforcement policies, accus-
ing them of "fearmongering," of "pit[ting] Americans against immigrants" and
"citizens against non-citizens," and of "scar[ing] peace-loving people with phan-
toms of lost liberty.",2 To criticize the government, said the Attorney General,
was to "aid terrorists," to "erode our national unity and diminish our resolve,"
and to "give ammunition to America's enemies."3 When criticism is cast as a
small step shy of treason, you can be sure that you are walking in the shadow of
McCarthyism.
I would like this afternoon to consider with you some of the lessons of
this country's World War II experiences with civil liberties, especially those
touching on race and ethnicity. We are now just more than five months past the
trauma of September 11. The corresponding time sixty years ago-five months
after the attack on Pearl Harbor-was the beginning of May of 1942. Think with
me for a few moments about the government's domestic record on civil liber-
ties, race, and ethnicity during these two five-month periods. We will see that
the differences outweigh the similarities: as troubled as many of us may be by
the breadth of the administration's recent assertions of power, the fact is that the
excesses of the Roosevelt record in the months after Pearl Harbor eclipse the
Bush Administration's actions since September 11.
It is important for us to acknowledge this-to let this fact sink in and
steep a bit-before we undertake the more difficult tasks of understanding why
it might be so and of deciding how, if at all, that difference ought to influence
our thinking about today's debates about interrogation, detention, and ethnic and
racial profiling. We might examine the lessons of history and decide that they
are just too off-point or ambiguous to guide us in our new war on terrorism. But
we also might conclude that the lessons of World War II point us toward a path
of moderation between the darkest parts of the shadows cast by that old war and
the cold war.
Today, five months after the attacks of September 11, several hundreds
of aliens are in federal custody.4 Most of them-for all we know, it could be all
I Senator Joseph McCarthy, Address at the Ohio County Republican Women's Club
(February 9, 1950).
2 Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1 206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm (Decem-
ber 6, 2001) (Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
3 Id.
4 I exclude here the hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters taken prisoner during the
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of them, but the government has not publicized their identities-are citizens of
Arab and Muslim countries. They fall into several categories. Some are held on
suspicion of violating the immigration laws. Some are held on criminal charges
unrelated to terrorism and the events of September 11. Some might still be under
detention as "material witnesses." 5 And at least two are held on terrorism-related
charges.
6
The exact number of federal detainees has been tough to determine. The
Justice Department released a list of some of the detainees in November, but has
since refused to update it or provide other information about those under deten-
tion.7 The ACLU has sued to force the government to release more information
about whom it is holding and for what reasons,8 but the government is fighting
the lawsuit. Some estimate the total number of people arrested after September
11 at well over one thousand, but we know from press accounts that the gov-
ernment has released some people.9 Ultimately, we are left to guess how many
aliens from Arab nations are in federal custody five months after September 11.
Five hundred might not be too terribly far from the mark.
More than twice that number of Japanese aliens were in federal custody
within not five months but three days of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Beginning
on the evening of Sunday, December 7, 1941, FBI agents, assisted by local law
enforcement, swept through the Japanese communities of the West Coast and
arrested aliens they considered "dangerous."10 By that Wednesday, some 1200
Japanese aliens were in custody, along with about 800 German aliens and a
military campaign in Afghanistan.
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2001).
6 The two whose cases have been in the public eye are Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged
"20th hijacker" charged with conspiring to kill Americans in the September 11 attack, and
Richard Reid, the so-called "shoe bomber" who was apprehended while allegedly trying to
detonate explosives in his shoes on a transatlantic flight. For a time it appeared that there was a
third, an Egyptian student named Abdallah Higazy, who was held for thirty-one days after an
aviation radio was purportedly found in a hotel room he occupied near the World Trade Center
on September 11. Higazy was freed when another person claimed the radio. See Dale Lezon, A
Winding Road to Justice, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 27, 2002, at 1. I do not count John
Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," who has been charged with terrorism-related
offenses, but under vastly different circumstances due to his allegedly taking up arms with the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
7 When the Attorney General testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on December
6, 2001, he explained that the Justice Department was not releasing the names of those held on
immigration charges both because federal statutory law forbade it and because the Department
did not want the al Qaeda network to know who was under federal detention. See Frank Rich,
Confessions of a Traitor, THE N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A23.
8 See Rebecca Carr, Groups Sue U.S. to Learn Who's Held in September 11 Probe, THE
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Dec. 6, 2001, at 14A.
9 See Brooke Masters and Patricia Davis, Moussaoui Has Va. Hearing, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at A32.
10 See ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA 34 (1972).
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much smaller number of Italians."1 Unlike today's detainees, nearly all of whom
we believe are being held on the basis of at least some sort of violation of the
criminal or immigration laws, none of these post-Pearl Harbor arrestees of Japa-
nese ancestry had violated any law. They were arrested because the government
thought them dangerous, 12 and the government thought them dangerous for no
other reason than that they had been active in their immigrant communities.
They were prominent businessmen, leaders of Japanese cultural and civic or-
ganizations, Japanese language teachers, judo instructors, and Buddhist priests.
1 3
We have heard reports of shameful delays in the release of innocent ali-
ens wrongly swept up in the FBI's post-September 11 dragnet, and there are
undoubtedly many people among the hundreds still under detention whose inno-
cence the government has yet to confess or discover. 14 Sixty years ago, however,
the aliens rounded up within days of Pearl Harbor were detained for months
before being given any opportunity to contest their incarceration.15 And even
when they were "released," they were not really freed; those from the West
Coast (which is to say nearly all of them) were forbidden to return to their
homes, and had no choice but to join their imprisoned wives and children in the
government's ten inland "relocation centers."
6
Not long after the federal government concluded its most aggressive
sweep for aliens after the September 11 attacks, word leaked out about a federal
investigative plan that quickly drew criticism and even sporadic resistance. On
November 9, Attorney General Ashcroft sent a memorandum to the nation's
ninety-four United States Attorneys and to antiterrorism task forces across the
country, asking them to interview more than five thousand young aliens about
their activities in the United States, their familiarity with terrorist groups, their
experience with weapons, and other things of that sort.17 None of the five thou-
sand was a suspect, the Justice Department emphasized; the interviews were
purely for gathering information about al Qaeda and other foreign-based terror-
ist organizations.
18
See COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED 55 (1997).
12 In the months before Pearl Harbor, the FBI had compiled three lists of potentially danger-
ous aliens. The lists were labeled "A," "B," and "C," in descending order of perceived danger.
Louis Fiset describes these so-called "ABC lists" in his wonderful book IMPRISONED APART 28-
29 (1997).
13 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 54.
14 See, e.g., Bart Jones, Terror Probe Detainee Freed, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 2002, at A26.
is See FISET, supra note 12, at 46-5 1.
16 See id. at 75-82; ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY 19, 71 (2001).
17 See Interview Guidelines Set for Questioning 5,000 about Links, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2001, at A4.
is See Karen Gullo, Investigators Questioning 5,000 Foreigners in U.S.; Colleges Provide
Data on Arab Students, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A5.
[Vol. 104
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The trouble was that the five thousand men had been selected because
they had all come to the United States from countries with suspected terrorist
links-mostly Arab and Muslim countries-on student, tourist, or business visas
within the two prior years. Almost immediately, the plan was attacked as racial
and ethnic profiling.19 The government tried to persuade the public that the pro-
gram was based not on a person's ethnicity per se but on his recent arrival from
places where terrorists are known to operate. 20 The government also emphasized
that the interviews were voluntary, and that the interviewees could have a law-
yer present if they wished. Many, however, were not persuaded. Arab American
community leaders and the ACLU assailed the program as coercive,21 and police
departments in some parts of the country either criticized the federal policy or
refused to help the federal government implement it.
22
The comparison with Japanese aliens during World War II is, however,
instructive. The government undertook a program of interrogating people of
Japanese ancestry during that war, but ethnicity was the only factor that deter-
mined who was questioned. The questioning took place early in 1943 in the ten
permanent relocation centers to which the entire ethnically Japanese population
of the West Coast had been moved in the fall of 1942. The government's pur-
pose was to gauge loyalty to the United States rather than knowledge of infor-
mation that might be helpful in prosecuting the war with Japan, so the analogy
to the recent questioning of Arab aliens is admittedly imprecise. But the federal
government in 1943 was completely indiscriminate in its targeting. If a person
was over eighteen, of Japanese ancestry, and in a relocation center, he or she
had to fill out a loyalty questionnaire. 23 It made no difference whether the in-
ternees were aliens or citizens, whether they had ever lived in Japan or held duel
citizenship, whether they spoke any Japanese, or even whether they had served
with the American armed forces in World War I. All ethnically Japanese people
were of equally suspect loyalty in the eyes of the government, and all were
questioned.
We might roll our eyes when our government today defends its interro-
gation program as ethnicity-neutral. After all, while the five thousand young
men may not have been selected because they are Arab, we do know that they
were selected because they arrived recently from countries where al Qaeda op-
erates, and that certainly sounds like a pretext for anti-Arab discrimination. But
19 See Geralda Miller, Federal Plan to Interview Arab Men Called 'Dangerous', THE
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 21, 2001, at D6.
20 Gullo, supra note 18.
21 See Patricia Hurtado, Cops to Do Immigrant Interviews, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 6,
2001, at A35; William Glaberson, The Interviews: Legal Experts Question Legality of Ques-
tioning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at B6.
22 See Scott Learn, Cities React, Portland Catches the Heat, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec.
17, 2001, at C1.
23 See MULLER, supra note 16, at 50.
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on closer examination, especially in the comparative light of the interrogation of
the ethnically Japanese during World War II, the government's defense of its
program is plausible. 4 The 1990 census counted about 940,000 people of Arab
ancestry in the United States,25 about eighteen percent of whom were non-
26citizens. This made for a total of about 170,000 aliens of Arab ancestry living
in the United States in 1990. The numbers in the year 2001 were naturally a
good deal higher, although a precise count will not be available until the year
2000 census data are released late in 2002. Still, 5,000 is just under three percent
of 170,000, a number so small as to suggest that the government did in fact tar-
get people for questioning on the basis of criteria other than the raw fact of their
origin in an Arab country. The additional criteria that the government an-
nounced-age of between eighteen and thirty-three years and recent arrival from
a country believed to have been a way-station for members of al Qaeda-
certainly seem to describe a major subset of those who might have some infor-
mation, perhaps to them entirely innocent-seeming, that would help the govern-
ment fend off future al Qaeda attacks.
Most importantly, despite dire predictions that the supposedly informa-
tion-gathering interviews would be mere pretext for coercive criminal interroga-
tions, this turned out not to be so. 27 After a somewhat clumsy start, the FBI
quickly responded to suggestions and complaints from the Arab American
community and ran interviews that lawyers in attendance called "polite, even
solicitous. '28 The FBI's New Jersey office invited a prominent lawyer in the
Muslim community to give a sensitivity training session to federal agents and
local police, and the event was standing-room-only. 29 In the meantime, the re-
sponse rate from those the government asked to interview was around ninety
percent, and the Attorney General reported when the interviews were through
that they had produced "several leads." 30 Of course, the government now also
has a list of those who declined to be interviewed, and it remains to be seen
24 For purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, of course, the bar of neutrality is not
particularly high: discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is, after all, not gender discrimina-
tion, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); and discrimination on the basis of Spanish
language ability is not ethnic discrimination, see Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
25 See Gordon Trowbridge, Arab Americans Lose Out in Census, THE DETROIT NEWS,
March 26, 2001, available at http://detnews.com/2001/census/0l03/30/cO1-204055.htm. The
figure of nearly a million has been criticized as dramatically low; according to a prominent
Arab American pollster, the number should have been closer to 3.5 million. See id.
26 See The Arab American Institute, What the 1990 Census Tells Us About Arab Americans,
available at http://www.aaiusa.org/arabamericans/census/censustellsus.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2002).
27 See Niraj Warikoo, Interviews of Arab Men Are Finished, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 7,
2002, at lB.
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what use the government will make of that information. On the whole, though,
the program of interrogation, if it was ethnic profiling at all, was ethnic profiling
with a decidedly light touch.
It was just that-a light touch-that was conspicuously absent from any
of the government's policies toward Japanese aliens and Japanese American
citizens sixty years ago. Late in 1941 and early in 1942, the government sent no
letters to Japanese aliens and Japanese American citizens inviting them in for
interviews. Instead it swept through Japanese population centers in house-to-
house searches, seizing "contraband" such as radios, cameras, binoculars, and
even Japanese cultural and religious objects.31 Because it was acting under the
authority of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798,32 which authorized the President to
order the detention and removal of enemy aliens during a declared war, the gov-
ernment chose to ditch the Fourth Amendment entirely in framing its search-
and-seizure program. Gone was the requirement of a warrant from a neutral
magistrate. Instead, the administration's regulations allowed a law enforcement
agent to get a search warrant not from a judge but from the local United States
Attorney, on the basis of nothing more than his unadorned statement that the
premises to be searched belonged to an enemy alien.33 In cases of claimed ur-
gency, the regulations allowed agents to omit even this sham of an application
for an executive warrant.34 These might be thought unobjectionable practices for
searches of the homes of enemy aliens during wartime, but the trouble was that
most of those homes were occupied not just by Japanese aliens but also by their
children, all of whom were American citizens and many of whom were teenag-
ers and even young adults in December of 1941. As to these American citizens,
the search-and-seizure program was an unadorned and unapologetic violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
And for sheer breadth and depth of illegality, those searches in the win-
ter of 1941 and early 1942 did not even begin to compare to the outrages that
were in store for American citizens of Japanese ancestry just a few months later.
The story, of course, is well known, so I review only its broad contours here. In
March of 1942, acting under the authority of President Roosevelt's broadly
worded Executive Order 9066, military authorities imposed dusk-to-dawn cur-
fews on American citizens of Japanese ancestry living in a wide swath of terri-
tory along the West Coast, and also forbade them from traveling more than five
miles from their homes without permission. No such restrictions were imposed
on American citizens of German or Italian ancestry anywhere in the United
States. Then, in the spring of 1942, the entire ethnically Japanese population of
the West Coast, aliens and U.S. citizens alike, were forced from their homes and
31 For further discussion of the government's post-Pearl Harbor raids, see ROGER DANIELS,
ASIAN AMERICA 206-08 (1988).
32 See Alien Enemies Act, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. § 21 (2001)).
33 The text of this regulation is reproduced in DANIELS, supra note 3 1, at 206.
34 See id. at 207.
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into grim and overcrowded camps, euphemistically called "assembly centers,"
that were located at fairgrounds and racetracks in and near the coast's major
coastal population centers. Typically, families were given just two weeks to
wrap up all of their affairs and report for incarceration, bringing with them only
what they could carry. They spent the summer of 1942 in these camps, many of
them living in horse stables. They numbered nearly 120,000. Two-thirds were
American citizens.35
In the fall of 1942, the government transported them by train to the ten
more permanent camps that the government had hastily constructed, mostly in
barren, desert-like conditions in the Mountain West. The euphemism for these
facilities was "relocation centers," but everyone called them concentration
camps. They lived with neither comfort nor privacy in tarpaper barracks, sur-
rounded by barbed wire and guarded by U.S. Army sentries in guard towers
around the perimeter. After a time, the government made a form of parole avail-
able to those in the camps, allowing those who passed their loyalty tests to strike
out on their own for points east, so long as they had a place to live and a job,
promised not to mix with other Japanese Americans, and could stomach the
suspicions and biases of their new Midwestern and eastern neighbors.36 Some of
the Nisei had the wherewithal to relocate in this way. The majority, however,
remained with their alien parents in the camps until 1945, when the war ended
and the camps closed. At that point, most returned to the West Coast, where
nothing was left of their former lives and they struggled to start over again.
By mid-May of 1942, five months after Pearl Harbor, much of this hor-
ror was already underway. Politicians, generals, and newspapermen had been
proclaiming the untrustworthiness of any person of Japanese ancestry virtually
since the Japanese attack itself.37 A few, tentative early words from Attorney
General Francis Biddle urging tolerance toward Japanese Americans 38 had long
been silenced by the louder voices of racist suspicion. 39 The dusk-to-dawn cur-
few and the travel restrictions were already several months old, and the eviction
35 A good and very concise description of these events can be found in ROGER DANIELS,
PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL (1993).
36 The government's euphemism for this form of parole from the camps was "indefinite
leave." A good, albeit rather caustic, description of the leave program can be found in RICHARD
DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS 52-61 (1987).
37 John L. DeWitt, the commander of the Western Defense Command, put it succinctly in
1942 when he defended his policy of evicting even American citizens of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast with the quip that "a Jap's a Jap." See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra
note 11, at 222.
38 A few weeks after Pearl Harbor, Biddle urged Americans to remember that "the Bill of
Rights protects not only American citizens but all human beings who live on our American
soil." See PAGE SMITH, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 99-100 (1995).
39 For example, when Fiorello LaGuardia, the mayor of New York City, called for "decent
treatment for enemy aliens" after Pearl Harbor, he mentioned German and Italian aliens but
"pointedly omit[ed] mention of the Japanese." See DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA,
supra note 10, at 35.
[Vol. 104
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of Japanese Americans from their homes was in full swing. The federal gov-
ernment had already decided to move them from their temporary quarters in the
assembly centers to indefinite detention behind barbed wire in concentration
camps in the interior.4°
It seems almost silly to mention it, but in the five months since Septem-
ber 11 we have seen nothing like this. The government has taken no program-
matic action against American citizens of Arab ancestry or Muslim faith at all.
Indeed, it has done something like the opposite. Just six days after the attacks,
President Bush surprised many Arabs and Muslims (and, I might add, me) by
appearing at the Islamic Center of Washington, DC, and speaking out forcefully
in support of Arab and Muslim Americans. His words were powerful:
America counts millions of Muslims among our citizens, and
Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our coun-
try. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of
the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads. And
they need to be treated with respect.... Moms who [cover their
heads] must not be intimidated in America. That's not the
America I know. That's not the America I value .... Those who
feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their
anger don't represent America, they represent the worst of hu-
mankind, and they should be ashamed of that kind of behav-
or41ior.
4
The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation sounded much the same
theme that same day, and backed up his words with a promise of action:
Since the horrific attacks on September 11 th, dozens of retalia-
tory hate crimes have been directed at members of the Arab-
American community.... I want to make it very clear, vigilante
attacks and threats against Arab-Americans will not be toler-
ated .... Such acts of retaliation violate federal law and more
particularly run counter to the very principles of the equality
and freedom upon which our nation is founded.42
"The FBI and the Department of Justice," Director Mueller added, "are commit-
ted to aggressively investigating and prosecuting violations of the federal hate
40 For more on how the federal government settled on concentration camps for the ethnically
Japanese population of the West Coast, see MULLER, supra note 16, at 31-33.
41 Bush Remarks at Islamic Center of Washington, DC, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/Ol091722.htm (last visited March 11, 2001).
42 Statement of FBI Director Robert Mueller, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.adc.org/terror-attack/DirectorMueller.htm (last visited February 9, 2002).
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crime laws.'43 And the government followed up these words with action. The
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights quickly assigned to the Civil Rights
Division's National Origin Working Group the responsibility of "help[ing]
combat violations of federal civil rights laws affecting individuals perceived to
be Arab American, Muslim American, Sikh American, or South-Asian Ameri-
can." 44 That effort included both education and enforcement efforts, and by Feb-
ruary 10, the Justice Department had opened more than three hundred hate-
crime investigations and brought charges in about sixty.
45
The President and his Justice Department officials were not alone in
voicing support for Arab and Muslim Americans in the days after September 11.
On September 26, the House and Senate unanimously passed a concurrent reso-
lution declaring that "in the quest to identify, bring to justice, and punish the
perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks on the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001... the civil rights and civil liberties of all American, including
Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and Americans from South Asia, should
be protected," and "condemn[ing] any acts of violence or discrimination against
any Americans, including Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and Americans
from South Asia."46 Statements condemning ethnic or religious backlash also
came quickly from organizations across the social,
4 7 economic, 48 and religious 49
43 Id.
44 See United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Civil Rights Division
National Origin Working Group Initiative to Combat the Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg-nission.html (last visited February 10,
2002).
45 See Eric Lichtblau, Bias against U.S. Arabs Taking Subtler Forms, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at A20. To be sure, Arab and Muslim American organizations say the number of inci-
dents is far higher than the number actually reported. For example, the Council on Islamic-
American Relations reported the number of anti-Muslim incidents at 1,717 on February 8. See
Homepage of the Council on Islamic-American Relations, available at http://www.cair-net.org
(last visited February 10, 2002). On the other hand, the Washington Post reported in January
that law enforcement was finding it difficult to uncover retaliatory motivation underlying all
but one or two of the approximately seven murders that were initially reported as hate crimes.
See Alan Cooperman, Sept. 11 Backlash Murders and the State of 'Hate', WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2002, at A3.
46 H.R. Con. Res. 227, 107th Cong. (2001).
47 See, e.g., Japanese American Citizens League, JACL Urges Caution in Aftermath of
Terrorist Attack, Sept. 12, 2001, available at http://www.jacl.org/current_prs/01091200.htm
(last visited April 14, 2002) (statement of leading Japanese American civil rights organization).
48 See Statement by AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney on September 11 Tragedies, Sept.
12, 2001, available at http://www.aflcio.org/publ/press200l/prO912.htm (last visited April 14,
2002).
49 See American Jewish Committee Calls on All Americans to Avoid Stereotyping or Scape-
goating in Wake of Terror Horrors, Sept. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PressReleases.asp?did=309 (last visited April 14, 2002); An
Open Letter from the Rev. William G. Sinkford, President of the Unitarian Universalist Asso-
ciation, Sept. 14, 2001, available at http://www.uua.org/news/91101/sikh.html (last visited
[Vol. 104
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In drawing this comparison between the five months following Pearl
Harbor and the five months we have just lived through, I do not mean to dismiss
the very real indignities, and in some cases the very real terror and violence, that
Arab and Muslim Americans have actually endured. Taunts, scrutiny, and as-
saults plainly sting and scar, even though they may not match the scale of an-
other people's suffering in a different time. But the fact is that the past five
months do not match the scale of the civil rights tragedy that followed Pearl
Harbor. We ought to be able to wonder what, if anything, has changed in the last
sixty years without worrying that the question itself dishonors the victims of
today.
On reflection, we might conclude that nothing has changed-or at least
that we are not now in a position to say whether anything has changed. Even
quite similar events that occur at different times and in different contexts do not
lend themselves to easy comparison. And while the five months after Pearl Har-
bor and the five months after September 11 are similar in some basic ways, they
are also quite different in some basic ways.
Chief among the differences is the course of world events during those
two five-month periods. The Bush Administration has enjoyed the luxury of
crafting its domestic response to the September 11 attacks with its enemy on the
run. In the days immediately after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks,
the public was deeply afraid of a second wave of attacks, but that wave did not
appear. To be sure, there was great public fear in the month of October about
what seemed to be a follow-up act of bioterrorism, but within a few weeks, the
concerns about anthrax dissipated as it began to become clear that the scare may
have been the work of a domestic opportunist rather than al Qaeda.50 The
American military began its offensive in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, after
diplomatic pressure on the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden and his depu-
ties failed. On November 9, just a month later, Mazar-e-Sharif fell. The capital
of Kabul followed three days later. Kunduz fell on November 26, and Kandahar
on December 6. By December 16, the last of the al Qaeda caves in the moun-
tainous Tora Bora region was in friendly hands. And five days later, an interim
government for post-Taliban Afghanistan was sworn in, as many of the top offi-
cials of the prior regime remained in hiding or in flight.51 Osama bin Laden dis-
appeared from public view entirely amid speculation that he had died or been
killed.52
April 14, 2002).
50 See Liz Marlantes, "Domestic Loners Top Suspect List in Anthrax Attacks," CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 19. 2001, at 2.
51 A timeline of events in the military campaign in Afghanistan can be found at
http://www.mapreport.com/countries/afghanistan.html.
52 See Peter Popham, "He May Be Dead, He May Be Trapped," THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON) . Dec. 22. 2001. at 10.
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The contrast with the five months that followed Pearl Harbor could not
be starker. The attack in Hawaii was one of a number of coordinated attacks on
that day that Japan launched all around the Pacific Rim. Japanese forces at-
tacked in the Phillipines, at Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Thailand, Shanghai,
and Midway. Three days later, they launched an all-out invasion of the Phillipi-
nes and overran Guam. On December 11, Japan invaded Burma, and on Decem-
ber 16 and 1.8, British Borneo and Hong Kong. On Christmas Day, the British
surrendered at Hong Kong. By the end of January, 1942, the Japanese had in-
vaded the Dutch East Indies, Dutch Borneo, and several of the Solomon Islands.
American forces in the Phillipines were isolated in Bataan, and the British had
withdrawn to Singapore. By mid-February, Singapore was in Japanese hands.
Later that month, Japanese warplanes unleashed a huge assault on Darwin, Aus-
tralia. On February 23, a Japanese submarine shelled a stretch of beach near an
oil refinery close to Santa Barbara, California. By early April, the Japanese were
in New Guinea, in Burma's capital of Rangoon, and finally in control of the
Phillipines with the American surrender at Bataan. As the five months following
Pearl Harbor ended, Japan dominated the Pacific Rim, and had its eye on India,
Australia, and the Aleutian Islands off Alaska.53
The trauma of September 11 has been intense, and our fears of further
acts of terrorism quite real. Our troops have faced real danger in Afghanistan,
although happily with little loss of American life. Even so, the political pres-
sures on the Roosevelt Administration in early 1942 must have been extraordi-
nary-and far greater than the pressures to which President Bush and his advis-
ers have had to respond. Had September 11 been but the first in a succession of
similar terrorist acts by Arab and Muslim members of al Qaeda, the public
might well have demanded more aggressive and invasive investigation of Arab
and Muslim aliens in the United States, and even of American citizens of Arab
ancestry and Muslim faith. And the Bush Administration's commitment to pro-
tecting Arab and Muslim Americans would have been put more powerfully to
the test.
A second important difference between 1942 and 2002 is the difference
between the targeted minorities. Japanese Americans were not singled out for
uniquely illegal treatment during World War II just because the image of the
Asian in American culture more easily conjured up images of treachery than the
image of the German or the Italian. They were also uniquely isolated and vul-
nerable in every important way. They were geographically concentrated in a
way that German and Italian Americans were not; nearly ninety-five percent of
the ethnically Japanese people in the continental United States at the start of
World War II lived in a narrow strip along the Pacific, where the perceived dan-
ger of a Japanese attack was greatest. Japanese Americans, as a group, were also
economically powerless. They were primarily farmers, although some owned or
worked in small retail stores and some worked in relatively low-paying service
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industries. There was not a single Japanese American in elective public office.
And most of Japanese America lacked the franchise: The immigrant generation,
forbidden by law from naturalizing as citizens, remained aliens and could not
vote. And most of their children, although born in this country, had not yet
turned eighteen by 1942. 54
More importantly, Japanese Americans were especially attractive targets
for mistreatment because they had long been the victims of vicious economic
discrimination in the states where they lived. By the 1930s and early 1940s, the
Japanese had become very successful farmers up and down the West Coast,
often tilling land that had been thought unsuited for commercial agriculture.
They were, quite simply, the envy of their white competitors. For years before
Pearl Harbor, a combination of white nativists and agricultural competitors had
lobbied, often successfully, for laws that would prevent Japanese immigrants
from owning land themselves and even from holding it as guardians for their
U.S. citizen children. For these interests, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
was, in at least one sense, a dream come true: it gave them the opportunity to
push for the out-and-out eviction of their Japanese competitors. Nativist groups
and the agricultural lobby were among the earliest and most vocal supporters of
the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Thus, the eviction
and internment of Japanese Americans can really be understood not so much as
a military necessity as the capstone of a long campaign of economic discrimina-
tion.55
Arab and Muslim Americans, by contrast, are happily not so easy or at-
tractive a target. They are dispersed across the American landscape, both geo-
graphically and economically. Arab Americans are not concentrated in one nar-
row region; indeed, to the extent that the Arab American population is concen-
trated at all, it is in three regions that span the nation-Los Angeles, Detroit, and
New York.56 Roughly a third of the Arab American population lives in or near
those three urban areas, while another third is scattered across seven other
states.57 Arab and Muslim Americans are also an economically diverse group. A
recent poll shows that half of American Muslims earn over $50,000 per year,
and 58 percent are college graduates.58 Arab Americans have a median income
that is higher than the national average.59 About sixty percent of working Arab
54 For a comprehensive description of Japanese America in the years before the war, see
DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA, supra note 31, at 100-85.
55 For more on the economic rationale for the exclusion of Japanese Americans, see
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 42-44.
56 Roughly one-third of the nation's Arab population lived in or near these three urban
areas, according to the 1990 census. See The Arab American Institute, Arab Americans: Demo-
graphics, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/demographics.htm (last visited April 14, 2002).
57 See id.
58 See Virginia Culver, Many American Muslims Well Off, College Educated, Poll Shows,
THE DENVER POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at B3.
59 See 100 Questions and Answers about Arab Americans: Demographics, DETROIT FREE
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Americans are business executives, professionals, and office and sales staff.60
And finally, Arab Americans claim a number of prominent political leaders
among their number, including former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, current Energy Secretary and former U.S. Senator Spencer Abraham,
former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, current New
Hampshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen, former New Hampshire Governor and
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, and 2000 presidential candidate Ralph
Nader.6'
In short, the post-September 11 world is not the world of late 1941 and
early 1942, and the post-September 11 war is not the war of that earlier time. To
the extent that some American xenophobes might point the finger at a domestic
enemy today, that supposed enemy is far closer to the political, social, and eco-
nomic mainstream than our supposed enemy of sixty years ago, and in a far bet-
ter position to protect itself. When we see the restraint in the Bush Administra-
tion's policies touching on civil liberties, race, and ethnicity, we may just be
seeing the difference that some sturdiness in the suspected minority group and
some stability in our sense of security can make.
I would like to speculate, however, that these differences do not fully
explain the Administration's policies, and that we may be seeing an important
change in the legal landscape as well. What we may be witnessing is the long-
overdue death of the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United
States62 and the principle of permitting broad racial assumptions in wartime
policymaking that the decision represented. Fred Korematsu was a twenty-two-
year-old American citizen of Japanese descent in May of 1942, living and work-
ing as a draftsman in San Leandro, California, when he and his family were or-
dered to report to the assembly center at the Tanforan racetrack for indefinite
incarceration. Korematsu's family did what they were told, like almost all Japa-
nese Americans at the time. But the young man just wanted to go about his
business and stay in town with his Italian-American girlfriend. At the end of the
month of May, he was arrested and charged with the crime of violating the mili-
tary's exclusion order. In defense, Korematsu argued that the order was uncon-
stitutional. When he was convicted, he took the case all the way to the United
States Supreme Court.63
Voting six to three, the Court upheld the exclusion order against Kore-
matsu's due process challenge. 64 Relying on government allegations that were
PRESS, available at http://www.freep.coml/jobspage/arabs/arab4.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2002).
60 See id.
61 See Arab Americans: Dispelling Myths, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 2.
62 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63 For a detailed account of the background and decision of the Korematsu case, see PETER
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 93-99, 151-54, 177-85, 311-41 (1983).
64 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-24. His argument sounded in equal protection, but he could
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later revealed to be knowingly false,65 Justice Black insisted that military neces-
sity was the basis for the government's selective program of excluding just
Japanese Americans, and not German or Italian Americans. 66 "To cast this case
into outlines of racial prejudice," Justice Black wrote, "without reference to the
real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. 67 For
the three dissenters, however, the racial selectivity in the military order did not
confuse the issue; it was the issue. Justice Murphy put it bluntly: "th[e] exclu-
sion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,' from the
Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity ... goes over the 'very brink
of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
', 68
Justice Jackson, as was his habit, put things rather more gracefully and
more memorably. Jackson did not believe himself to be in a position to second-
guess the military's assessment that the wholesale exclusion of Japanese, but not
Italian or German, Americans was necessary. 69 For that very reason, he did not
think it right or wise for the Court to review the order for conformity with the
Constitution. "A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutional-
ity," Jackson wrote, "and it is an incident."70 But when the Court reviews that
decision and approves it, "that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution." And the danger of that, for Justice Jackson, lay not in the present
but in the future. Once approved by the Court in the name of the Constitution,
the military order acquires "a generative power of its own, and all that it creates
will be in its own image."'', The Court's Korematsu opinion, said Jackson, had
"for all time validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal proce-
dure and of transplanting American citizens.,' 72 That principle, Jackson worried,
would "lie[ ] about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.,
73
Perhaps in the government's policies of the last five months, we can
discern some evidence that Justice Jackson may have predicted wrongly. The
fact is that the Court's opinion in Korematsu has not had the generative power
that Justice Jackson feared. It is true that the Korematsu decision has never been
not invoke the Equal Protection Clause because the Court had not yet made it applicable to the
federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
65 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417-19 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
66 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 244-45 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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formally overruled, and some worry that this means some on the Court might
still see the case as good law.74 I think not. First, the main reason that Kore-
matsu has not been overruled is that happily-and contrary to Justice Jackson's
prediction-nothing like the facts of Korematsu have arisen in the last sixty
years. In order to overrule a precedent, as distinct from merely disapproving it,
that precedent must stand squarely in the way of the Court's achieving a desired
outcome in a new case. Thus, the Court has not overruled Korematsu primarily
because it has not needed to. But more importantly, to the extent that Korematsu
stands at all today, it stands as a deeply discredited decision. Eight of the nine
currently sitting Justices on the Court have either written or concurred in opin-
ions describing Korematsu as an error75 -even as spectacular an error as the
Court's Dred Scott decision. 76 It seems safe to say that the majority opinion in
Korematsu would not command a single vote today, let alone a majority.
The sixty years that passed between December 7, 1941, and September
11, 2001, were eventful ones in the legal and social development of race and
ethnicity in this country. Ten years after Korematsu came the Court's stunning
74 See Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v United States: A Dangerous
Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AMER. L. J. 72 (1996); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism
under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the 'Racing' of Arab Americans as 'Terrorists, '
8 ASIAN L. J. 1, 11 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, Introduction: Praising with Faint Damnation-The
Troubling Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B. C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1998).
75 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.) ("Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even 'the most
rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification.... Any retreat
from the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occur-
ring in the future."); id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (referring to the
"shameful" and "invidious" burdens that the government imposed on Japanese Americans dur-
ing World War II, some of which the Court upheld in Korematsu); id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) ("[T]he enduring lesson one should draw from Korematsu" is
that "scrutiny the Court described as 'most rigid' nonetheless yielded a pass for an odious,
gravely injurious racial classification."); Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) ("Even strict scrutiny may not have suf-
ficed to invalidate early racebased laws of most doubtful validity, as we learned in Kore-
matsu.").
Chief Justice Rehnquist's condemnation of Korematsu has been the most tepid. In his
1998 book ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE, the Chief Justice defended Koremastu insofar as it upheld
the internment of Japanese aliens, and only mutedly criticized the Court for its holding insofar
as it upheld the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. See WILLIAM
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 203-09 (1998). For a critical assessment of Rehnquist's
book, see Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1395 (1999).
Only Justice Souter has not condemned Korematsu, and this likely because he has not yet
had occasion to do so.
76 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I am optimistic enough
to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of
this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.").
[Vol. 104
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss3/7
12/7 AND 9/11
and unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education.7 That, in turn, was
followed by decades of effort by the federal courts to implement Brown and
dismantle a deeply entrenched system of racial separation and subordination in
public education. The political branches joined the effort twenty years after Ko-
rematsu with the passage and signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,78 barring
public and private discrimination in a wide variety of settings. The military,
which clung to racial segregation during World War II, transformed itself into
an integrated institution. The stories of people other than European whites came
for the first time into broad public view, in grade school textbooks, on televi-
sion, and in the movies, and these stories began to weave themselves into the
national fabric. And, perhaps most symbolically for our purposes today, Kore-
matsu itself was gutted in the political process when Congress passed and Presi-
dent Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.79 That Act con-
firmed the findings of an independent commission that the wartime internment
of Japanese Americans had been unjustified by military necessity as well as
illegal,80 called for the President to issue a formal apology to the surviving in-
ternees, and authorized a $20,000 token redress payment to each of them.
To be sure, the story of these past sixty years has not been one of relent-
less progress on racial matters. Deep difficulties remain, and racial and ethnic
differences continue to be flashpoints of controversy and even violence in our
society. But the restraint in the government's response thus far to the trauma of
September 11 might suggest an important change in the legitimacy of racial and
ethnic assumptions in our policymaking. The general responsible for ordering
the eviction and incarceration of Japanese Americans from the West Coast in
1942 defended his decision with the memorable quip that "a Jap's a Jap.,' s Any
effort at distinguishing citizen from alien, or loyal from disloyal, was, for the
general, pointless. His comment caused little outcry, because the public knew
what he meant, and most agreed. That is the sort of reasoning, if you wish to call
it that, that sixty years of time and change have pushed to the very fringes of
legitimate policymaking discourse, or perhaps beyond them. To be sure, the
Court's opinion in Korematsu did leave a loaded weapon lying about, as Justice
Jackson feared. But the passage of six decades may have emptied much of the
ammunition from its chambers.
To some, this may sound like pure Pollyanna. But I have one additional,
and I think fairly persuasive, reason to suspect that we might be witnessing a
shift in the spectrum of acceptable discourse and policy on race and ethnicity
during wartime. Let us look for a moment at the Bush Administration's civil
liberties record since September 11 on matters not touching on race and ethnic-
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2002).
79 See 50 App., U.S.C. §§ 1983 et seq. (2002).
80 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 1-18.
81 Id. at 222.
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ity. We quickly see a pattern emerge-a pattern in which the administration has
first claimed or requested an extraordinarily broad power, only to narrow its
claim or request in response to public reaction and criticism.
The administration's first major domestic policy proposal in the wake of
September 11 was its request that Congress significantly expand the powers of
federal law enforcement. Within just a few days of the attacks, the Attorney
General began to speak publicly about the need for quick reform in federal wire-
tapping rules and money laundering statutes. 82 He focused on the need for "rov-
ing wiretaps," which would allow surveillance of an individual wherever he
went rather than of a particular phone line.83 But by September 19, when the
Administration formally presented legislation to Congress, the proposal had
ballooned into an enormous and complex set of new proposals and amendments
to a large number of existing federal statutes. 84 Roving wiretaps were just one of
the many proposed changes.
The Attorney General implored Congress to pass the legislation as pro-
posed, and immediately. 85 "The American people," he told the House Judiciary
Committee on September 24, "do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erect-
ing the necessary defenses to future terrorist acts. 86 As it happened, though,
things moved more slowly than the Administration planned. The same week that
the legislation was announced, the ACLU brought together a broad coalition of
civil rights and public interest groups to oppose the changes, or at least to urge
deliberation and moderation in considering them.87 Politicians from the left-
such as Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont-and from the libertarian right-
such as Representative Bob Barr of Georgia-began voicing concerns that
things were moving too fast.88
It was not until October 26 that the legislation ultimately passed both
Houses and was signed by the President-a very speedy process to be sure, es-
82 See Pete Yost, "Ashcroft Seeks Enhanced Wiretap Powers," AP ONLINE, 2001 WL
27337295 (Sept. 16, 2001).
83 See Elaine S. Povich, "Ashcroft Seeks Broad Laws," NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 2001, at A63.
84 See Wayne Washington & Mary Leonard, "US Seeks New Power to Track, Detain, De-
port," THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2001, at A3 1.
85 See Congress Urged to Act Quickly on Anti-Terrorist Legislation, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 18, 2001, at A4.
86 See Elaine S. Povich, Ashcroft: Act Fast on Terrorism; Lawmakers Urged to Pass
Statutes, NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 2001, at A9.
87 See Nat Hentoff, Getting Back Our Rights, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 18, 2001, at 30.
Interestingly, the coalition included groups from all over the social and political spectrum,
including such disparate organizations as the National Lawyers Guild, the National Council of
Churches of Christ, and the Gun Owners of America.
88 For a description of the emergence in Congress of Republican opposition to the USA
PATRIOT Act, see Jeffrey Toobin, Crackdown: Should We Be Worried about the New Antiter-
rorism Legislation?, THE NEW YORKER, November 5, 2001, at 56.
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pecially for such far-reaching changes, but a good deal slower than the passage
"by week's end" that John Aschcroft had demanded in mid-September. By the
time it passed, the law's title had changed from the relatively innocuous "Mobi-
lizing Against Terrorism Act" to a name with an acronym to make George Or-
well proud: the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, or "USA
PATRIOT Act." The law gave the government the roving wiretaps the Attorney
General had wanted, but it also gave the government much, much more. Among
its provisions were increases in the penalties for a variety of terrorism-related
crimes, a new bioterrorism prohibition, search warrants with nationwide effect,
and relaxed rules for the monitoring of e-mail messages of suspected terrorists.
Two additional and controversial provisions relaxed secrecy rules to allow
prosecutors to share grand jury and wiretap information with intelligence agen-
cies, and extended from two to seven days the period for which an alien sus-
pected of involvement with terrorism may be detained for questioning without a
criminal or immigration law charge.89
This is hardly a package for a civil libertarian to stand up and cheer. But
the public criticism and political pressure did temper the bill in a couple of sig-
nificant ways. The government had asked for a power to detain aliens indefi-
nitely, but got seven days instead.90 Congress insisted upon a four-year sunset
on the surveillance provisions of the Act, which means that Congress will have
to specifically reenact those provisions if it wants to retain them.91 In the context
of the whole bill, these are admittedly small constraints. But constraints they
are, and it is in some sense incredible that any such constraints managed to
emerge during the panic of September and early October.
In mid-November, the President announced his executive order author-
izing the trial of foreign nationals suspected of membership in al Qaeda in a
military tribunal.92 This time, the outcry was more intense, possibly because the
public's fears had begun to settle a bit with the passage of time and the crum-
bling of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Lawyers set to debating whether Bush's
order was supported by the precedent of the Quirin case93 from World War II, in
which President Roosevelt ordered trials by military tribunal for Nazi saboteurs
who came off of submarines onto the U.S. mainland in New York and Florida.
Civil libertarians and some policymakers stressed the inconsistency of defend-
ing our free, rights-based society with trials that denied suspects all of the free-
89 For a summary of a very lengthy and convoluted bill, see Adam Clymer, Antiterrorism
Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers, THE N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al, B5.
90 See John Lancaster, Anti-Terrorism Bill is Approved, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 13,
2001, at Al.
91 See Toobin, supra note 88, at 56.
92 See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 2001 WL 1422287 (Nov. 13, 2001).
93 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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doms we cherish. And initially, the Administration's response was to dig in its
heels. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in early December, the
Attorney General asked scornfully, "Are we supposed to read [the al Qaeda cap-
tives] the Miranda rights, hire a flamboyant defense lawyer, bring them back to
the United States to create a new cable network of Osama TV?"
94
When draft procedures for the military tribunals surfaced several weeks
later, however, they were a lot closer to Miranda and a flamboyant defense law-
yer than anyone had expected. They contemplated unanimity for the death pen-
alty, a presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, presump-
tively public proceedings, a right to appointed counsel, a right against self-
incrimination, a right to confront witnesses against them and to present their
own witnesses, and a right of appeal to a distinct appellate tribunal. 95 In short,
the draft procedures made the military tribunals look startingly like civilian
courts. Crucial differences of course remain, most notably the absence of any
sort of impartial reviewing body outside the executive branch. Still, the pattern
was noteworthy: a stark assertion of almost infmitely broad power, public scru-
tiny and protest, and a final move toward moderation.
We have seen the same pattern play out on the issue of the status of cap-
tured Taliban fighters. Initially the administration staked out the position that
neither Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan were formally
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions; it deemed them all "un-
lawful combatants." Protest from domestic and international human rights
groups and some of our European allies followed. Eventually Secretary of State
Colin Powell persuaded others in the administration that denying the protection
of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban captives would compromise our claim for
compliance with those conventions for captured American soldiers overseas.
And the President announced a change in policy: while none of the captives was
to be given formal prisoner-of-war status, Taliban captives would be entitled to
the protections of the Geneva Conventions.9 6
This has been the pattern on government power and civil liberties since
September 11: extreme assertion, outraged reaction, and eventual moderation.
We can quibble, of course, about whether "moderation" accurately describes the
ultimate position the administration has taken in any of these areas. But that is
not my purpose in citing these examples. I mention them to point up a contrast
with the administration's domestic initiatives touching on race and ethnicity,
where, strikingly, we have not seen this pattern. The reason we have not seen it
94 See Zachary Coile, Ashcroft Stands His Ground/Civil liberties focus of Judicial Commit-
tee testimony, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 7, 2001, at A17.
95 See Neil A. Lewis, The Military Tribunals: Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on
Death Penalty, THE N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at Al; Bush's Rules for Tribunals Taking
Shape; Draft Allows Hearsay, Requires Unanimous Vote for Death, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 28, 2001, at A17.
96 See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, THE
N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 8. 2002. at Al.
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is that in this one area the government has not seen fit to lead with extreme as-
sertions. In the terror and panic of mid-September, the administration might
have proposed all manner of restrictions on aliens from Arab and Muslim coun-
tries, or even on American citizens of Arab ancestry or Muslim faith. The mind
boggles at the possibilites: prohibitions on piloting or traveling on airplanes,
bans on crossing bridges or entering skyscrapers, residential curfews, forced
relocation or deportation, wholesale detention and interrogation of all aliens
from particular nations. Yet none of this happened; in this area the administra-
tion has proceeded from a premise of moderation, and has not had to be forced
to that position by the pressure of public protest.
Naturally, some have protested the administration's policies anyway,
but in context it is the protests and not the policies that can seem extreme. Late
in September, for example, James Ridgeway wrote in the Village Voice that "the
racial profiling that allows the government to keep tabs on [more than 7 million
American Muslims] may be the modem equivalent of a concentration camp.
97
This is an accusation that is doubly unjust: it is unfair to the public officials who
have worked hard to avoid anything like a replay of the Japanese American in-
ternment, and it is unfair to the tens of thousands of Japanese Americans who
came to know through bitter personal experience what it really meant to be
locked up in a concentration camp.
In the context of Bush administration's larger enforcement agenda
touching on civil liberties, some sort of constraint is operating in the area of race
and ethnicity. Undoubtedly international politics provides some of the constrain-
ing force. The Bush administration is trying to sustain a broad coalition that
includes Arab and Muslim nations, and a domestic enforcement strategy that
more aggressively targeted people on the basis of their Arab ancestry or Muslim
faith would complicate that effort.98 But we might also speculate that coalition
maintenance does not fully explain the restraint. Admittedly in fits and starts,
this country's judicial, legislative, and executive departments have been pursu-
ing a process of discrediting racial and ethnic assumptions in policymaking
since the dark days of the Japanese American internment in World War II. The
five months we have just been through allow us to think the hopeful thought that
we are far enough along in that process even to weather a national crisis.
Naturally, it is too soon to tell whether these suspicions of progress are
real. The shadow of the Japanese American internment is as long as it is dark,
and we are still undoubtedly walking in its penumbra. How will we know when
we have emerged fully from it, when we are in the free and clear? I doubt we
will ever know, and this is ultimately a very good thing because it will keep us
vigilant. Justice Jackson put the point nicely in his Korematsu dissent:
97 James Ridgeway, John Ashcroft's New America, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 2, 2001, at 41.
98 This would not be the first time in American legal history that international and diplo-
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If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irre-
sponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power
equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who com-
mand the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the
past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of
their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.99
"The moral judgments of history" are, of course, unavailable to us today. Only
our children, or perhaps their children, will know for sure how history will judge
this country's domestic response to September 11 and the peril of international
terrorism. But this does not absolve us of responsibility, because we are George
Bush's and John Ashcroft's "contemporaries." If anything is to restrain them, it
is our political judgments.
Five months into this war on terrorism, we have some evidence that the
system of restraint that Justice Jackson envisioned is working. At several key
moments, articulate voices have challenged the government's plans. By and
large, the administration has responded constructively. In the healthy light of
public scrutiny, something like a middle course has appeared.
At times, however, that course has veered dangerously toward the dark-
ness of McCarthyism. The Attorney General could not have been more deeply
and terrifyingly wrong in December when he publicly equated criticism with
treason. Criticism is the engine of sound policy, not its enemy. Of course, criti-
cism is not the same thing as reflexive condemnation, and at least as to the ad-
ministration's policies touching on race and ethnicity, I believe it has earned at
least a mild presumption of good faith. Still, Justice Jackson's instruction from
sixty years ago must guide our steps today. The path between the shadow of
Korematsu and the shadow of McCarthyism is the one identified by Justice
Jackson-the path of rigorous scrutiny and robust criticism.
99 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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